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The UAE still supports al-Shabaab through Somalia’s illicit charcoal trade



Since the inauguration of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012, the United Arab Emirates has increasingly vied with other regional powers for influence in the country, investing in infrastructure, and bolstering the country’s military capabilities.

The UAE opened a military training facility in Mogadishu in 2015 to train members of the Somali Armed Forces, and a Dubai-based firm has managed

Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport beginning before the government transition.

Rose Worden

Rose Worden is a researcher and writer based in New York

During the massive Mogadishu truck bombing in October 2017, it was widely reported that the UAE promised to treat 100 injured civilians. The country responded by sending a flying hospital, and provided additional support to orphaned children through the Emirates Red Crescent.

Yet, the UAE’s continuing participation in an illicit Somali charcoal trade undermines these positive contributions.

For years, the UAE has been cited as the primary destination for the illicit charcoal trade coming from Somalia over the years, and has been implicated in the recent formalisation of the trade, which has persisted since the inception of the FGS, documented by the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

In 2011, al-Shabaab controlled much of southern Somalia, and was estimated to receive between $70 million and $100 million annually through taxation and extortion in the area, including of illegal charcoal exports, which posed a major challenge for the incoming government.

Recognising the charcoal trade’s role in financing al-Shabaab, the UN issued called for a total ban on charcoal exports from Somalia in 2012 (resolution 2036).

That year, as the FGS attempted to consolidate territorial control, militia leader Ahmed Madobe led a paramilitary group against al-Shabaab in in the Battle of Kismayo (fought over the southern port city of the same name).

Madobe’s group assisted the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) in taking the strategically important port, before it later reverted back to al-Shabaab control.

The FGS continues to operate against a dense network of many fractious interests in its attempts to gain and hold territory and domestic legitimacy. Below the surface of international mandates and public relations campaigns, the illicit charcoal trade has continued unabated.

Madobe became President of the interim Juba administration which contained Kismayo, in 2013.

His rise to power coincided with the tenure of a locally operating tax collector for al-Shabaab with deep involvement in the charcoal trade, named Ali Ahmed Naaji.

In November, 2015, the group Journalists for Justice published a report implicating members of the KDF (who controlled the Kismayo port along with Jubaland forces), in a charcoal and sugar smuggling operation along with the interim Juba administration and al-Shabaab.

Toward the end of 2015, al-Shabaab briefly changed its strategy, attacking and punishing associates of the charcoal trade, as importing countries including the UAE improved enforcement of the charcoal ban.

Hassan Hussein and Abdi Musa cut down a tree to make charcoal in the village of Jalelo, Hargeisa. In Somalia cutting down trees for the charcoal industry risks turning the terrain to desert [AFP]

The Monitoring Group noted “as a result of improved charcoal ban enforcement by the United Arab Emirates, dhows [traditional ships] became reluctant to load charcoal in Kismayo and Buur Gaabo in May 2016”.

In Somalia, the combined restrictions on the 2016 charcoal trade hampered a key revenue stream of the interim Juba administration. The Monitoring Group cautioned that the Juba administration’s reliance on charcoal export revenue, extracted through checkpoints and tax applied at the port, jeopardised its ability to pay police forces, putting them at risk of defecting to al-Shabaab.

This adverse impact of enforcing the ban highlights the complexity of alliances and power dynamics and explains short term incentives around maintaining the status quo on all sides. UAE enforcement of the ban was short-lived, and by the end of 2016, al-Shabaab had reverted to taxing the trade.

Ali Ahmed Naaji, previously tax collector for al-Shabaab, would become financier of the Jubaland Chamber of Commerce in 2016, and join an alliance called the All Star Group, also known as the All Star Trading Company, which, today, says the report, “comprises the main illicit charcoal suppliers, traffickers and investors in Kismayo and Dubai”.

Multiple, unconfirmed reports have indicated that a revenue sharing agreement exists between the All Star Group of suppliers and traffickers, and al-Shabaab.

The Monitoring Group has also reported that Naaji “received death threats from the Amniyat [an elite branch of al-Shabaab] demanding a resumption of charcoal revenue sharing”. Last month, the KDF disputed photographic evidence implicating its members in continued involvement.

Recognising Dubai as the principal destination for Somali charcoal exports, the UN estimated the total annual value of the Somali charcoal trade in 2016 at between $135 million and $180 million wholesale in the UAE, and between $171 million and $228 million retail.

The stakes in illicit charcoal for the UAE remain high relative to their risk.

Perhaps that is why the Monitoring Group has reported that over the past year, transnational criminal networks operating in Somalia and the UAE “may have assumed a more formal structure”. Today, al-Shabaab systematically taxes charcoal between stockpiles and ports at Kismayo and Buur Gaabo further south.

“A conservative estimate suggests that al-Shabaab receives at least $10 million each year from the illicit charcoal trade. Dubai, United Arab Emirates, continues to be the primary export destination as well as a hub for criminal networks that violate the charcoal ban with near impunity.

“The United Arab Emirates, particularly Port Al Hamriya in Dubai, continues to be the principal destination for illegal exports of charcoal from Somalia.”

In this scenario, the UAE is primarily responsible for generating the demand fuelling Somalia’s illicit charcoal trade.

If the UAE is genuinely supportive of development and security in Somalia, it should enforce the charcoal ban and eliminate a crucial revenue source for al-Shabaab.

The UAE should consider options to support Somalia’s federal government to alleviate pressure on the Juba administration and upset the ossified incentive structures that promote the illicit trade, and therefore finance al-Shabaab, rather than contribute to the trade’s formalisation.

The illicit trade is one thread in a complex web that perpetuates al-Shabaab’s entrenchment. For the cost of contributing to al-Shabaab’s destructive presence, the UAE can afford to get its charcoal elsewhere.

Rose Worden is a researcher and writer based in New York.
She holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from The New School and is focused on development and security in the Horn of Africa and MENA.

Somali Articles

How Somalia’s charcoal trade is fuelling the Acacia’s demise




The Acacia bussei, a slow-growing hardwood, has long been the backbone of Somalia’s multimillion-dollar trade in charcoal.

For decades, the country struggled to implement a 1969 ban on charcoal and firewood exports. The gradual erosion of state institutions, which resulted in complete lawlessness and an outbreak of a full-fledged civil war in 1991, only further undermined the initiative.

The production and export of charcoal – an economic activity that dates to pre-colonial times – has long served to meet local and regional energy requirements as well as provide livelihoods opportunities for many families.

However, with the protracted conflict, weak law and order, vague rules over resource ownership, and a lack of alternative sources of energy and livelihoods, the last few decades have seen an increase in unsustainable charcoal production.

Consequently, the trade in charcoal has accelerated threats such as environmental degradation and conflict over the control of resultant revenue. Despite a 2012 UN Security Council ban on importing Somalia’s charcoal, the trade has continued apace: the market value of the exported commodity was estimated to be more than $250 million dollars over the two years following the ban.

Over-exploitation of the acacia for charcoal and fuelwood is a threat to livestock and the livelihoods of pastoralists. (Andy Hall/Oxfam)

Why should the environmental community care about the threat posed by charcoal?

A study by the Food and Agriculture Organization, in conjunction with the Somalia Water and Land Information System, estimated that there is a 5 per cent annual decline in the Acacia bussei due to felling. In 1996, the War-Torn Societies Project reported that northeastern Somalia was producing approximately 4.8 million sacks of charcoal annually. Such a volume would require the logging of nearly 2.1 million Acacia trees.

Consequently, with the deforestation and lack of replanting, the Acacia bussei was placed on the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s Red List of threatened species.

For years, this evergreen, drought-tolerant indigenous tree has provided feedstock to pastoralists and helped them stay resilient to droughts. But with increased demands for charcoal, the Acacia bussei is becoming an impractical source of fodder. This has jeopardized the livelihoods of many pastoralists.

The losses due to such recurring droughts will only increase in the future: In a global ranking of vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, Somalia ranked 7th out of 233 countries and regions.

Following the Security Council ban, in 2016 various UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization and UN Environment, launched an initiative to promote international cooperation in support of the ban.

The initiative, the UN Joint Programme for Sustainable Charcoal Reduction and Alternative Livelihoods, notes that due to the absence of an effective government, the country lacks adequate natural resource management and enforcement mechanisms. It calls for an in-depth assessment of its institutional capacity to address environmental degradation.

“Overcoming the challenges charcoal poses to the environment requires strengthening of institutions and the provision of alternative and sustainable livelihood opportunities. Natural resource-sharing and management mechanisms should be implemented in partnership with the Government of Somalia,” said Saidou Hamani, the coordinator of UN Environment’s work on resilience to disasters and conflicts in Africa.

Goma charcoal
The environmental challenges of charcoal production are not limited to Somalia. The thriving charcoal trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Virunga National Park, pictured above, is also a driver of deforestation. (UN Environment)

With the prevalent political instability, influential traders and militia groups – who do not engage in the charcoal production process – have infiltrated the charcoal distribution chain to extort income.

The value of the revenue has also been acknowledged by the Al-Shabaab extremists, who earn millions from this “black gold” and offer protection to export companies that are owned by the group’s ideological affiliates.

However, recent advances of the African Union Mission in Somalia troops, Kenyan, Ethiopian and Somali forces, have led to the recovery of territory from the Al-Shabaab group and appear to have halted the trade.

“Somalia has a huge opportunity to diversify its energy sources through reduction of reliance on charcoal and firewood in favour of alternatives like wind, solar, liquefied petroleum gas, biogas, hydro and high-efficiency thermal generation and distribution systems,” said Hamani.

Despite possessing untapped reserves of numerous natural resources such as uranium, iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt and natural gas, Somalia’s energy sector remains grossly under-developed. Organic plant and animal material provide over 95 per cent of primary energy for households either as firewood or charcoal.

The UN agencies hope to exploit the huge opportunity to div

Contact Oli Brown


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UAE is using local instability to sow discord in Somalia




Tensions between Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS) and Somaliland’s government have come to a head over a tripartite revenue-sharing agreement among the Republic of Somaliland, the Dubai-based company DP World, and the Ethiopian government, based on DP World’s management of a port in Berbera. (more…)

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Somali Articles

Civil strife in Ethiopia has the potential to destabilise the whole region




Ethiopia is experiencing ethnic and political tensions that could have far-reaching implications for its neighbors in the Horn of Africa, and beyond.

The Horn of Africa is among the most congested, eventful, and most volatile geopolitical intersections on earth. It is where the West meets the East in a highly competitive game of strategic positioning for economic or hegemonic advantage.

China and Turkey who, more or less, employ similar soft-power strategies have tangible investments in various countries in the region, including Ethiopia. However, the widespread discontent with Ethiopia’s repressive impulses and its ethnic favoritism that led to a particular ethnic minority (Tigray) to exclusively operate the state apparatus has inspired Arab Spring-like mass protests. These protests have caused serious rancor within the ruling party. It is only a matter of time before this haemorrhaging government might collapse.

So, who is likely to gain or lose from this imminent shockwave in the region’s balance of power?

The Nile Tsunami

Ethiopia — a country previously considered as a stable regional hegemon, a robust emerging market, and a reliable counter-terrorism partner — is on the verge of meltdown, if not long-term civil strife.

Today, the Ethiopian government is caught between two serious challenges of domestic and foreign nature: the Oromo/Amhara mass protests tacitly supported by the West, and the water rights conflict with Egypt, Sudan and Somalia.

Ethiopia is claiming the lion’s share on the Nile that runs through it and other rivers that flow from its highlands for the Grand Renaissance Dam – thus presenting existential threats to the connected nations.

For the third time in three years, the Shabelle River has dried up, putting millions of Somalis at risk of starvation.

But the current government is not ready for a substantive change of guard. The longer the mass protests continue and the minority-led government continues to offer artificial or symbolic gestures of prisoner releases — while declaring a second ‘state of emergency’ in two years— the faster Ethiopia will become destabilised and the faster foreign investments will fizzle away.

Worse — though seemingly unthinkable — the ‘favorite nation’ status granted to Ethiopia after becoming the US’ main partner in the global ‘War on Terroris’ is slowly corroding.

Despite this week’s visit from US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the US State Department is gradually turning its back on Ethiopia for a number of reasons; chief among them, is its double-dealings on the South Sudan issue.

Despite the facade of US/China collaboration to end the South Sudan civil war, the geopolitical rivalry between these two giants has been pressuring Ethiopia to pledge exclusive allegiance to one over the other.

With China’s huge investments on Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan’s oil fields – making a choice won’t be too difficult.

The Kenya Factor

Several years ago I wrote an article arguing that the two most stable nations in the Horn (Kenya and Ethiopia) will become more unstable as Somalia becomes more stable.

Today, the Ethiopian government is facing the most serious threat since it took power by the barrel of the gun, and Kenya has a highly polarised population and two presidents ‘elected’ along clan lines.

Kenya — the nerve center of the international humanitarian industry — could just be one major incident away from inter-clan combustion.

The Somalia Factor

The Ethiopian government has launched a clandestine campaign of strategic disinformation intended to fracture or breakup opposition coalitions and recruit or lure potential comrades.

Ethiopian intelligence officers and members of the diplomatic corps together with some ethnic-Somali Ethiopians have been recruiting naive Somali government officials, intellectuals and activists with a Machiavellian disinformation campaign.

Meanwhile, IGAD — Ethiopia’s regional camouflage — calls for an open-borders agreement between member states. Despite broad-based public perception that for a fragile state like Somalia, such an agreement would be tantamount to annexation, some Somali politicians are eagerly carrying its banner.

These kinds of desperate campaigns and the abrupt resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn only underscore the fact that the government’s days are numbered.

The Sudan Factor

Sudan is caught in a loyalty triangle (Ethiopia, Egypt and Turkey) with competing powers. Sudan needs Egypt to address threats faced by the two nations regarding the diminishing access to the Nile by reasserting rights granted through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

It needs Ethiopia to protect China’s economic partnership and to shield President Omar al Bashir from Western harassment through IGAD.

It also needs Turkey for development and for a long-term strategic partnership. Sudan has become the second country in Africa to grant Turkey a military base, with Somalia being the first.

The Eritrea Factor

When neocons dominated US foreign policy and the global ‘War on Terror’ was the order of all orders, Eritrea was slapped with sanctions. It was accused of being the primary funder and weapons supplier to al Shabab.

Today, though neither the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia or Eritrea nor any expert free from Ethiopian influence holds such a view, yet the sanctions have not been lifted.

The Ethiopian lobby and certain influential elements within US foreign policy-making circles continue to label Eritrea as a Marxist rogue state that undermines regional institutions such as IGAD and international ones like the UN Security Council; a closed society that espouses a deep rooted hatred towards the West.

Against that backdrop, the UAE has been investing heavily in Eritrea since 2015 or the beginning of the Yemen war that has created one of the the worst humanitarian disasters. The Emirati military (and its Academi/Blackwater shadow) now operates from a military base in Assab. Whether that’s a Trojan Horse or not, is a different discussion altogether.

Ins And Outs

The current wave of discontent against the Ethiopian government is likely to continue. But, considering how the Tigray has a total control on all levers of power, a transition of power will not be an easy process.

Ethiopia is also rumoured to have created an ethnically Somali counterinsurgency force in the Liyu Police. This ruthless force has already been used against the Oromos as they were used against Somalis of various regions that share a border with Ethiopia.

The extrajudicial killings and human rights violations are well documented. Despite all this, the Oromo and Amhara are set to reach their objectives albeit with bruised and bloody faces.

Will their coalition remain or, due to their historical distrust, will each eventually invoke its constitutional right to secede?

Whatever the outcome, any scenario of civil war or chaos in Ethiopia could put the entire Horn in danger and create a potential humanitarian catastrophe, especially in Somalia.

Meanwhile South Sudan is a lightyear away from sustainable political reconciliation especially since the foreign elements fueling the fire are not likely to stop any time soon. Djibouti remains the host of the most intriguing geopolitical circus. So, that leaves Eritrea as an island of stability in the region.

In the foreseeable future, Turkey could divest her investment out of Ethiopia into Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. China will diversify her portfolio to include Eritrea. And the US — with no new policy — will continue droning her way through geopolitical schizophrenia.


Abukar Arman is a Somali political analyst, writer and former Special Envoy to the United States. Arman is also a widely published foreign policy specialist, writing extensively on Somalia and international political affairs.

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